



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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September 29, 1983

[Redacted]  
Office of Deputy Director  
Room 7E12  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

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Dear [Redacted]

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Rather than leave you the unenviable task of drafting my views on the CI analytical issues, I thought it might be helpful if I put down a couple of key points on paper for the panel.

On the question of enhancing the current analytical capabilities of the FBI, CIA, and military services, I very much believe they need to be improved--by an orderly growth in the numbers of professional analysts, and, even more important, through the establishment of a number of senior grade slots (15, 16, 17) to prevent the best talent from leaving analysis for those operational slots which lead to advancement.

No area requires continuity for effectiveness more than analysis. All CI elements in my view suffer from a shortage of senior personnel who can look at a particular issue with the perspective of a broad knowledge of past operations.

*agree* | I see no value in creating a new analytical component outside of the existing agencies. First of all such a component would receive only what it was fed and would lack the broad access to other matters to make even a judgment as to their relevancy.

While I would be opposed to creating a new element, I nevertheless believe that with minimal alterations to the existing SIG organizational framework, a mechanism needs to be developed to address significant problems, many of which are ongoing.

*damage assessment?* | Major operations of any element which are lost need to be studied against all agencies' holdings so that the agency heads and senior operational officers get the best answers as to what went wrong.

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-2-

*Physical person?*

The security of the Intelligence Community and those agencies regularly in receipt of intelligence information needs to be assessed on an ongoing basis.

NIEs which deal in a coordinated way with threats abroad and domestically ought to be done on terrorist threats. Such topics as Soviet active measures, the CP and foreign efforts to influence the peace movement need to be examined in a unified way without regard to those quite proper territorial and jurisdictional concerns which quite correctly govern operations. Operational jurisdiction should not prevent senior decision makers from having information presented to them in a coherent manner.

*The alternative*

My suggestion would be to have the chairmen of the SIG-I, IG-CI, and IC-CM jointly task those analytical studies which they consider to be needed. The final reports would be made to them and they would determine further dissemination.

The analysts should be drawn from existing elements to address a particular issue, as teams are put together for a particular NIE now. A senior officer should be chosen by the three chairmen to manage the studies, staff them from all elements, monitor their progress, and ultimately review and present the finished product to the chairmen.

I cannot see any reason why that senior officer could not be detailed from his present agency to perform such tasks for the chairmen for at least a 2-year term. I do not think it ought to be filled by someone who will remain in it permanently. There may be some advantage in making this a final career posting so as to avoid any future career dependency which particularly in the area of the analysis operational failures might be difficult.

I see no advantage to the proposals to place such an officer in the NSC or Department of Justice. I feel very strongly that he should be in support of the three chairmen and not be a fourth element which in any way diminishes their authorities or intrudes on their jurisdictions.

These are difficult issues which are made even more difficult by the "multi-disciplinary" jargon. As I stated to you all, while I am a great supporter of multi-disciplinary threat analysis, I do not believe there is such a thing as multi-disciplinary counterintelligence and have been gravely

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
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-3-

concerned that having given the non-existent such widespread publicity, people will create a process in which our counter-intelligence efforts will, in fact, be damaged rather than enhanced.

Finally, while there is always room for improvement, I thought U.S. counterintelligence was remarkably effective based primarily on our recruiting efforts. If you have enough sources reporting, the importance of analysis as one source of answers tends to become diminished, as we come to expect someone to tell us what we want to know. But having experienced long periods in the past when such sources were either very scarce or very questionable, I don't think we can afford not to enhance our CI analytical capacity and productivity, particularly when to do so, costs really very little.

Sincerely,



James E. Nolan, Jr.  
Director, Office of  
Foreign Missions

cc: Director Webster, FBI

*You have some very good points,  
but I fear the focus is on  
human only. We have to worry  
about the technical collection methods  
too —*

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